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United States Can Learn from the United Kingdom
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress
of the human mind As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made.. . and opinions change
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to
wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy.
-Thomas Jefferson'
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred and seventeen years ago, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis published an article titled The Right to Privacy,
introducing the idea that "existing law affords a principle which
may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from
invasion. ' 2 The two contended that protection of the individual "is
a principle as old as the common law" but "[p]olitical, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law . . . grows to meet the demands of society."3 The
"growth" perceived by Warren and Brandeis was mankind's right
to an "inviolate personality, ' ' a right "to be let alone,"5 a right to
privacy.
Allegedly, the stimulus for the article was Warren's recent
marriage into a wealthy "blue blood" Bostonian family. Warren
found that his marriage was accompanied by detailed reports of his
family life in Boston's Saturday Evening Gazette.6 This naturally
annoyed Warren. who conferred with Brandeis, resulting in The
Right to Privacy. Beyond the personal experience of Warren, the
two scholars identified urgent threats to privacy that had a broader
effect on society as a whole:
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF
THE VIEWS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 726 (John P. Foley ed., 1900) [hereinafter
THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA].
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193, 206 (1890).
3. Id. at 193.
4. Id. at 205.
5. Id. at 195 (citing Thomas Cooley, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1907)).
6. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 966 (1964) (citing Alpheus
Mason, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1960)).
7. Id.
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Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person . . . . Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of the private
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that "what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops."8
Ironically, Warren and Brandeis's nineteenth century
apprehension for "recent inventions" and "business methods" is
even more pertinent in the twenty-first century. In 1890, the two
were concerned that photographic technology and yellow
journalism would diminish "each individual['s] right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others." 9  Today,
individual autonomy is matched against new opponents: e-mail and
electronic surveillance. In 1985, the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment reported that the "primary purpose of
electronic surveillance is to monitor the behavior of individuals,
including individual movements, actions, communications, [and]
emotions ..... 10 This new "business method" of electronic
monitoring is capable of completely erasing an individual's right to
privacy in his e-mails, thereby diminishing his ability to determine
what aspects of his life remain private or public.
Computer technology and the Internet have reshaped and
revolutionized the private-sector workplace unlike any
technological advance since perhaps the Industrial Revolution.
Unfortunately, this new technology developed into a double-edged
sword. Although the Internet allows for faster communications
and greater access to information, it poses an unparalleled threat to
privacy rights. The Internet has spawned countless privacy issues;
this comment focuses upon the lack of e-mail privacy afforded to
an employee within corporate America." Given that "e-mail
remains the most prevalent online activity, with 87.8 percent of
8. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195.
9. Id. at 198.
10. United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal
Government Information Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil
Liberties, OTA-CIT-293 9 (October 1985), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/ota/ns20/yearf.html [hereinafter 1985 OTA Surveillance Report].
11. This comment focuses upon the private-sector workplace. Public-sector
privacy claims rely upon the Fourth Amendment because the employer is a
government entity. The themes and ideology surrounding privacy permeate the
controversy at both levels; however, analysis of the two sides is substantially
different given that private-sector employees have no direct constitutional claim.
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Internet users sending and receiving e-mail,"'12 preserving the
individual's right to control the extent to which these personal
communications are disclosed is critical. Advances in technology
and deficiencies within the law have created a work environment
in which an employer can read, monitor, and store employee e-
mails without ever being detected,' 3 without ever breaking the law,
and with no regard to employee privacy. Frustrated commentators
have labeled the current legal situation as creating "electronic
sweatshops,"' 4 being "haystack[s] in a hurricane,"' 5 and as a legal
"sleeping giant.' 16
Thomas Jefferson believed that the law should respond to the
progression of the human mind.17  Regrettably, in the arena of
electronic privacy, lawmakers in the United States have ignored his
philosophy. The legal framework in the United States is
antiquated and cannot adapt or adjust to the changes in society and
12. United States Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics
Administration & National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
A Nation Online: Entering the Broadband Age 9 (2004), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04. htm. The report
found that 54.6 percent of U.S. households have access to the Internet and that
between 2001 and 2003, "the number of households with Internet connections
grew by 6.9 million." Id. at 5.
13. See 1985 OTA Surveillance Report, supra note 10, at 11:
New surveillance tools are technically more difficult to detect, of
higher reliability and sensitivity, speedier in processing time, less
costly, more flexible and adaptable, and easier to conceal .... Current
R&D will produce devices with increased surveillance capabilities ....
See generally Larry 0. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic
Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 345
(1995) (discussing balancing of employer/employee interests and the need for
privacy in the workplace); Jay P. Kesan, Cyber- Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A
First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L.
REv. 289 (2002) (discussing contract law as a basis of ensuring employee
privacy in the workplace); Dan McIntosh, Comment, e-monitoring@
workplace.com: The Future of Communication Privacy in the Minnesota
Private-Sector Workplace, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 540 (2000) (discussing the
competing interests of employees wishing to maintain their privacy and
employers seeking to prevent misuse of technology).
14. Catherine Collins, Bill Would Require Notices When Bosses Snoop on
Employees, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at D2 ("[U]nrestrained surveillance of
workers has turned many modem offices into electronic sweatshops" (quoting
Senator Paul Simon)).
15. Bloustein, supra note 6, at 962 (quoting Ettore v. Philco Television
Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956)).
16. David Neil King, Comment, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector
Workplace: Protection from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging "Privacy
Gap, " 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 441,441 (1994) (quoting Pamela Burdman, Employee
Privacy in Peril in the High-Tech '90s, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1992, at B1).
17. THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 726.
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technology. The primary avenues through which an employee
would hope to find e-mail privacy protections are tort law, federal
law, or state law. Unfortunately, at every turn, the employee finds
the road blocked because the law heavily favors the interests of the
employer over the privacy rights of the employee. 18 Common law
remedies have an "expectation of privacy" requirement that
insulates employers from liability. 19 Applicable federal legislation,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), fails to
protect the employee because it is confusing, poorly drafted, and
riddled with holes and exceptions. 20  State constitutional
protections rarely apply to private employers, and state statutes
either parallel the flawed ECPA or are inapplicable to private
employers. 2 1 In essence, the privacy rights of employees vanish
the moment they come in contact with their workplace or
employer.
The condition of employee e-mail privacy protection in the
United States is a gross injustice. When Warren and Brandeis
perceived a problem in 1890, they called for and took the "next
step" in protecting the individual. Presently, there is a problem in
our electronic privacy law, and again it is necessary for the law to
catch up to technology and to the needs of the people. Numerous
scholars have approached this issue by engaging in comparative
analysis between U.S. law and European versions, but comparative
studies fall short of providing a solution to the problem. This
comment proposes a solution by calling for the abandonment of the
ECPA and the adoption of legislation that mirrors the provisions,
ideas, and foundations of the electronic privacy law of the United
Kingdom-the Data Protection Act ("DPA").
Part II of this comment explicates and analyzes the three paths
an employee might utilize when attempting to redress an invasion
of privacy, ultimately showing that the employee's right to privacy
is unprotected at each level. Part III discusses the emergence of
electronic monitoring in the workplace and the threat it poses to
privacy. More importantly, Part III explores the U.S.'s conception
of privacy that justifies a legal framework that sacrifices the
privacy rights of the employee.
18. See generally Kesan, supra note 13, at 292; Steven B. Winters, Do Not
Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: An Examination of Workplace Privacy in Electronic
Mail, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 85, 94-97 (1992); Peter Schnaitman, Comment,
Building A Community Through Workplace E-mail: The New Privacy Frontier,
5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 177, 183 (1999).
19. See discussion infra Part I1.A.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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Part IV presents the creation, safeguards, and provisions of the
Data Protection Act. This section first charts the development of
the DPA, focusing on the influence of the European Union's
("EU") Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and the EU
Directive 95/46/EC, then outlines the DPA and its effects. Part IV
also explains why adopting the DPA is the best road to take. In
comparing the two bodies of law, the ECPA and the DPA, it is
clear that at each level the protections provided under the UK law
are more comprehensive than under applicable U.S. law.
II. THE LAW: A THIN VEIL AT BEST
Since Warren and Brandeis successfully presented their
concept of a right to privacy, numerous legal methods of protecting
this right have developed. For an employee seeking to remedy
what he feels is an invasion of e-mail privacy in the workplace,
there are generally three avenues of recovery. The first is found
within common law tort principles. The second is the vastly more
complex federal anti-wiretapping statute. Lastly, the individual
states have statutory versions of the federal anti-wiretapping
statute; for the most part these state statutes possess minor
variations of federal guidelines and protections.
A. The Common Law
Publication of Warren and Brandeis's article in 1890 was the
advent of privacy tort law. 22 The next step in the tort's evolution
was William Prosser's 1964 article Privacy.23 Prosser concluded
that privacy was "not one tort, but a complex of four," described as
follows: (1) intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of another; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing facts; (3) placing another in a
"false light" in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of another's
name or likeness.24 Each distinct tort attempts to recognize and
protect a "substantial zone of freedom ' 25 where an individual has
22. See generally Bloustein, supra note 6, at 963; Kesan, supra note 13, at
302-04; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960); Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 2, at 206.
23. Prosser, supra note 22, at 383.
24. Id, at 389. See also W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849-69 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
25. Gantt, supra note 13, at 374 (citing Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378,
381 (Miss. 1990)).
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the "right to be let alone." 26  A majority of employee claims
against an employer for e-mail monitoring involve the privacy tort
of "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another."
27
Therefore, the primary focus remains upon this version of the
common law remedy.
An employee's prima facie claim of intrusion has three
elements: "(1) an intentional intrusion; (2) that is highly offensive-
and (3) the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 29
An "intrusion" is easily accomplished because it need not be
physical in nature 29 nor does it require disclosure. 30 In most cases,
courts will find that electronic monitoring or surveillance is
sufficient to establish the first element. 3' Over the years, analysis
of the second element has merged into the third; the result being
that a privacy claim rests upon the employee's reasonable
expectation of privacy.
The courts have added an additional legal test to this crucial
element and require that the "expectation" be both subjectively and
objectively reasonable. 32  Fundamentally, the courts have placed
the elements for a Fourth Amendment constitutional claim into the
common law tort of privacy, 33 even though there is no enumerated
right to privacy found in the Constitution. Judicial application of
this subjective/objective test is to "first define the scope of an
employee's reasonable expectation of privacy" to determine its
subjective nature "and then balance the employer's business
interest[s] against the employee's individual rights" to determine
its objective nature. 34
In most cases, an employer can easily defeat any expectation of
privacy asserted by an employee. Any subjective expectation held
by the employee is generally unwarranted because at work the
employer defines the expectation of privacy by establishing an
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195 (citing Cooley, supra note 5,
at 29).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
28. Kesan, supra note 13, at 302.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
30. Id. at § 652B cmt. a.
31. Gantt, supra note 13, at 375.
32. Id.
33. Establishing a Fourth Amendment violation requires the claimant to
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy and an objective expectation
that society would consider reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967). See also Gantt, supra note 13, at 375; Winters, supra note 18, at
94-97.
34. Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 285,
290 (1996).
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office policy regarding electronic monitoring. 35  Additionally,
many courts find that any objective expectation of privacy is
outweighed by the "operational realities of the workplace." 36 The
net result is that "employees maintain few privacy interests that
cannot be overridden by strong employer interests or... intrusive
business practices."
37
Judicial interpretation of the "expectation" standard has
resulted in a convoluted entanglement that operates to protect the
employer and bar employee claims. The lack of recourse under
tort law is the first in a string of examples where the employee's
right to privacy is ignored in favor of the interests of the employer.
In the search for a remedy for an invasion of e-mail privacy, the
next avenue an employee may attempt is the federal anti-
wiretapping statute.
B. Federal Law: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
198638
In response to the 1968 holdings in Katz v. United States39 and
Berger v. New York,40 Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.4 1 This legislation regulated
the use of telephone wiretaps and hidden microphones to record or
intercept communications through a common carrier, the
35. Id. See also Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 26, 1993) (finding that plaintiffs had no expectation of privacy
because they were informed of company policy that restricted their privacy
rights); Hall Adams III, et al., E-mail Monitoring in the Workplace: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, 67 DEF. CouNs. J. 32, 44 (2000) (stating that the simplest
course of conduct is for employers to have a policy regarding e-mail); Kesan,
supra note 13, at 303 ("[B]y communicating an electronic monitoring policy, the
employer can establish the level of privacy that employees may reasonably
expect.").
36. O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). See also Smyth v.
Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Shoars v. Epson, Am., Inc., No.
SWC 112749 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1990) (both cases holding that the
employee had no expectation of privacy despite employer assurances that their
communications would not be intercepted). See also Barkesdale v. IBM Corp.,
620 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that recorded observation of
plaintiff's completion of experimental tasks was not an invasion of privacy).
37. Gantt, supra note 13, at 377.
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2722 (2000).
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court set the threshold for Fourth
Amendment protections at whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed
in the area searched by officials. See generally id.
40. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (extending the ruling in Katz to electronic
eavesdropping on oral communications).
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968) (amended 2000).
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underlying purpose being the protection of individual privacy
rights. Two decades later, congressional reports indicated that
the existing law under Title III was "hopelessly out of date."43
By 1985, Congress was well aware of the need to amend the
1968 version of Title III. Congress directed the Office of
Technology Assessment ("OTA") to study the effects that
electronic surveillance had upon civil liberties. The subsequent
report found that "innovations in electronic surveillance
technology ,Jhad] outstripped constitutional and statutory
protections.'" The primary area of concern was surveillance of
electronic mail or e-mail. The OTA found that "interception of e-
mail . . . involves a high level of intrusiveness and a significant
threat to civil liberties. ' 45 In regard to this concern, the report
repeatedly noted that the law lagged behind the technology and
that e-mail was afforded weak or nonexistent privacy protections.
4 6
The report also considered the differing protections afforded to
postal mail and electronic mail. It troubled the OTA that a letter
delivered by the U.S. Postal Service is granted extensive legal
protections while that same letter via e-mail is almost totally
insecure.47 The report found that:
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of
protection against unauthorized opening by a combination
of constitutional provisions, case-law, and U.S. Postal
Service statutes and regulations . . . .But there are no
comparable Federal statutory provisions to protect the
privacy and security of communications transmitted by...
new forms of telecommunications and computer
technology.
48
The OTA further criticized the situation as a "gap" in the
protection of privacy that resulted in irresponsible "legal
uncertainty."
49
Guided by the OTA's report and various committee hearings,
Congress's remedy for the "legal uncertainty" was an amendment
42. McIntosh, supra note 13, at 545 (citing Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000))).
43. S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556.
44. 1985 OTA Surveillance Report, supra note 10, at 12.
45. Id. at 45.
46. Id. at 3-4, 12, 45.
47. Id. at 45.





to Title III called the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986. Theoretically, the amended legislation "update[d] and
clariflied] Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications
technologies" in order to resolve the legal inadequacies of Title
III. Since its passage in 1985, the ECPA has undergone no
changes and, at present, is the primary federal law applicable to the
issue of workplace e-mail monitoring.
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Provisions
Originally, Title III applied only5 1 to communications
categorized as containing the human voice; therefore, the goal of
the ECPA was to expand protection into "non-voice portion[s] of a
wire communication." 52 To achieve this goal via an amendment,
Congress incorporated into the legislation a comprehensive set of
definitions, the most significant being § 2510(12), a broad
definition of "electronic communication." 5 3  Once Congress
defined the term, it was simply inserted into the statute wherever
Title III had previously referenced wire and oral
communications.
54
The next significant hurdle Congress had to overcome was that
electronic communications are more complex than the telephones
and "bugs" Title III regulated. The OTA report emphasized the
50. Id. at 3555.
51. Id.at3568.
52. Id. at 3567.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000) states, in pertinent part, that:
"[E]iectronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but
does not include-
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section
3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial
institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage
and transfer of funds ....
The legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the definition of
electronic communication to encompass e-mail. See Gantt, supra note 13, at
351 (referencing S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3568).
54. Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-mail and Voice Mail: Employee
Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219, 232-33
(1994).
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complicated nature of electronic communications, namely, the
vulnerability to interception and surveillance at every stage of their
existence.55 From transmission to receipt to storage, electronic
communications were almost totally unprotected by Title III.
Congress's solution was to divide the ECPA into two components,
Title I and Title II, which would protect the communications
during transmission or storage. 56  Notwithstanding this split in
coverage, the definitions found in Title I's § 2510 apply to Title II
as well, and the price for violating either part's provisions includes
both civil and criminal penalties.5
Title I, otherwise known as the Wiretap Act, prohibits any
585
person 8 from intentionally' intercepting any wire, oral, or
electronic communication. It also prohibits the use and
disclosure of any contents of intercepted communications. 60 Title I
expands Title III's definition of "intercept" to include both "aural
or other acquisition" and requires that the interception take place
through some kind of "electronic, mechanical, or other device." 61
Title II, designated the Stored Communications Act, prohibits
anyone from intentionally accessing wire or electronic
communications held in "electronic storage.' 62
55. 1985 OTA Surveillance Report, supra note 10, at 4.
56. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000) (Title I of the ECPA), with Id.
§§ 2701-11 (Title II of the ECPA).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 for civil remedy and § 2511(4)(a) for criminal
penalties under Title I. Id. §§ 2520, 2511(4)(a). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a)
for civil remedy and §2701(b) for criminal penalties under Title II. Id. §§
2707(a), 2701(b).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) defines a person as "any employee, or agent of the
United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual,
partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation." Id. §
2510(6).
59. Id. § 2511(1)(a).
60. Id. §2511(1)(b)-(d).
61. Id. § 2510(4). Although there appears to be no other statutory
requirements to interception, judicial interpretation varies and some courts
require that interception be contemporaneous with transmission. See, e.g.,
United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1 st Cir. 2005) (discussing but not
deciding whether interception had to be contemporaneous with transmission);
United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976); Wesley College v.
Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 385 (D. Del. 1997); United States v. Moriarty, 962 F.
Supp. 217, 221 (D. Mass. 1997); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232,
1236-37 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont.
1995).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000). "Access" was used in the 1968 version of
§ 2701, but neither that act nor the ECPA ever defines the term. "Electronic
storage" is: (A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any
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However, the two-pronged construction is the source of major
judicial confusion, which diminishes the ECPA's effectiveness.
Courts are cynical over the intersection of Title I and Title II, one
court labeling it as "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity."63 In 2005, the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals referred
to the intersection of Title I and Title II as "complex, often
convoluted., 64 E-mail makes the situation more complex because,
at various stages in transmission, the e-mail is temporarily stored
before moving on to its final destination.65 When applying the
ECPA to e-mail cases, the courts are divided over whether Title II
applies to momentary storage occurring during an e-mail's
transmission or whether Title II applies strictly to post-
transmission storage.66 The net result of the various interpretations
among the federal circuits is that the ECPA fails to have a coherent
standard of operation. Instead, the scope and extent of ECPA
protections largely depend upon which circuit has jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's claim rather than application of the statutory
language. Consequently, the structure Congress drafted into the
ECPA has made the law functionally confusing, problematic, and
inconsistent.
Legal scholars also criticize the ECPA's effectiveness in
protecting privacy by arguing that it focuses on "third party"
interception and fails to protect any privacy rights an employee
may have in his e-mail.67 Another troubling aspect of the ECPA
legislation is that it never refers to nor mentions privacy rights.
One would suppose that Congress's focus upon privacy in the
Act's development would be reflected in the Act itself, but that is
not the case. Another flaw is that the twenty-year-old legislation
attempts to regulate technologies that constantly advance.
While the bifurcated structure, lack of clarity, and ambiguous
history of the ECPA has garnered a large amount of disapproval, it
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication. Id. at § 2510(17).
63. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457,
462 (5th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th
Cir. 1998); Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. at 221; Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543
(5th Cir. 1994) (all citing Steve Jackson Games or independently pointing out
the lack of clarity in the sections).
64. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 80 (quoting Smith, 155 F.3d at 1055).
65. See source cited infra notes 108-09.
66. Compare Councilman, 418 F.3d at 80-82, with Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
359 F.3d 1066, 1075-77 (9th Cir. 2004), and Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003).




pales in comparison to the criticism the body of law has
experienced as a result of the statute's exceptions.
2. Statutory Exceptions Under the ECPA
In a workplace context, the ECPA theoretically protects the
privacy of the individual by prohibiting or limiting the extent to
which the employer could intercept or access an employee's
communications. Yet, the ECPA includes three general exceptions
to its provisions that are in direct conflict with that ambition. The
consent exception, 68 the service provider exception, 69 and the
business use exception 70 work in conjunction to negate any
liability an employer might incur under the ECPA. If an employer
shows that its monitoring activity fits under any one of these
exceptions, an employee's claim will fail.
a. Consent Exception
The consent exception is the least broad of the three exceptions
and is present in both Title I and Title 11.7 This exception
bypasses ECPA protections if a party to the communication gives
prior consent. While judicial interpretation of the consent
exception under Title II's provisions has yet to occur, the courts
have established that consent under Title I may be express or
implied 72 but "not . . .casually inferred., 73 An employer may
easily escape the ECPA provisions by simply establishing an office
policy of monitoring and making the acceptance of its policies a
requirement for employment. Therefore, oftentimes, an individual
must either give up a chance at employment or forfeit his right to
privacy.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000) (interceptions); id. § 2702(b)(3) (stored
communications).
69. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (interceptions); id. § 2701(c)(1) (stored
communications).
70. Id. § 2510(5)(a) (interceptions only).
71. See id. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2701(c), 2702(b)(3).
72. See United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing S.
REP. No. 90-107 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182); Watkins
v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
73. Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc'n, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (D. Kan.
1996) (quoting Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st Cir. 1993)).
970 [Vol. 67
COMMENTS
b. Service Provider Exception
The service provider exception shields Internet and e-mail
system providers from ECPA prohibitions under both Title I and
Title II.74 Again, Congress's statutory construction and unclear
language have made this exception vague and led to confusion
within the law.
Under Title I, the exception permits a service provider whose
facilities are used in the transmission of the communication, "to
intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course
of his employment while engaged in any activity that is a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service.' 5  Title I's
provider exception, then, confusingly amends itself and prohibits a
public provider of wire communications from carrying out random
monitoring.76 This ban on random monitoring only extends to wire
communications, leaving e-mail devoid of any protection and
vulnerable to random interception by a service provider.
77
Title II's provider exception has two parts. First, the ECPA
prohibition on accessing stored communications does not apply to
conduct authorized by the "service provider" of the electronic
communications system.78 Second, a "public service provider" is
allowed to disclose the contents of a stored communication if
disclosure is a necessary incident to the rendition of the service or
protects the rights or property of the service provider.
79
Confusion exists because Congress failed to distinguish a
"public service provider" from a "service provider"; nor did
Congress define or limit the language "normal course of
employment" or "necessarily incident to rendition of services."
With so little direction available and the broad scope of the
exception's language, commentators argue that the service
provider exception grants employers "unfettered discretion" in
monitoring their employees' e-mails. 8
0
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000) (interceptions); id. § 2701(c)(1) (stored
communications).
75. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
76. Id.
77. Greenberg, supra note 54, at 237.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a), (c)(1) (2000).
79. Id. § 2702(b)(5).
80. Gantt, supra note 13, at 359 (quoting Ruel Torres Hernandez, ECPA
and Online Computer Privacy, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 17, 39-40 (1988)); see also
McIntosh, supra note 13, at 553-55.
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c. Business Use Exception
The final and most unnerving exception to ECPA liability is a
carryover provision from pre-ECPA law, known as the business
use exception under Title I. Congress amended the definition of
"intercept" under Title I in order to extend protections to electronic
communications but added the requirement that an "electronic,
mechanical or other device" 8 1 be used in the interception of the
communication. Congress then retained a pre-ECPA restriction
and exempted certain types of devices or equipment from the
statute's prohibitions. Basically, this exception insulates
employers from liability if they use certain devices to monitor their
employees.82
The courts have adopted two general approaches in applying
the business use exception: the context and the content approach.
The context approach focuses on the circumstances surrounding
the interception, such as the extent, knowledge, notification, and
existence of a legitimate business purpose. 84 In practice, the courts
allow employers to escape liability if they "satisfy a checklist of
objective considerations." 85 This "checklist" inserts into the ECPA
the common law reliance upon "expectations of privacy," even
though the federal legislation should protect communications
regardless of these expectations. 86 The content approach stresses
the nature of the intercepted communication and whether or not it
is personal or business related. Precedent permits employers to
intercept a communication that is "likely to further any legitimate
business interest" or is "reasonably related to a business
purpose.'87 In the context of phone communications, an employer
may only monitor calls to the extent necessary to determine their
nature, and if the employer discovers that the call is personal they
must terminate the monitoring. 88
Judicial application of the business use exception to e-mail
monitoring has not yet occurred. Some scholars argue that this
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000).
82. Id. § 2510(5)(a).
83. Gantt, supra note 13, at 365.
84. See Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
85. Gantt, supra note 13, at 365 (citing Martha W. Barnett & Scott D.
Makar, "In the Ordinary Course of Business": The Legal Limits of Workplace
Wiretapping, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 715, 728 (1988)).
86. Id.
87. See Watkins v. L.M. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (1 1th Cir. 1983). See
also Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992); Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F.
Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y 1985).
88. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581-83.
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exception has no application to e-mails.89 However, others believe
that when claims involving this exception and e-mail appear before
the courts, the precedent under the context and consent approaches
will permit unrestricted interception of employee e-mails. 90 The
context approach converts the federal legislation into the common
law tort of privacy, which, as previously shown, affords no
protection to employees. 91 The content approach to e-mail is
unsound because an e-mail's business or personal nature can only
be discovered through looking at its contents. Using the content of
an employee's e-mail to justify the employer's intrusion is illogical
because the employer should have adequate justification before it
invades the employee's privacy.
92
Once any of the aforementioned exceptions are successfully
asserted, the ECPA fails to place any" restrictions on the form and
extent of such exempted monitoring. 3 It is unclear why Congress
elected to provide protections with one hand and then remove them
with the other.9 4 Nevertheless, the overall effect of the exceptions
is to completely offset the protections afforded under the ECPA.
Scholars have commented that, in light of the scope of the
exceptions, the ECPA is "ineffective in regulating the
employer/employee relationship." 95 In 1986, Congress set out to
"update and clarify Federal privacy9protections"96 in an effort to
remove the "legal uncertainty"" existing at that time.
Disappointingly, somewhere in the ECPA's conception, Congress
lost sight of its goals and enacted a body of law that affords limited
privacy protections and, ironically, has proven to be infused with
legal uncertainties. The only certainty connected to the ECPA is
that it fails across the board to protect the privacy rights an
individual, especially an employee, may have in his e-mails.
89. McIntosh, supra note 13, at 553.
90. Gantt, supra note 13, at 369-70.
91. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
92. Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc., 802 F.2d 412, 417-18 (11th
Cir. 1986) (Kravitch, J., dissenting). See also Gantt, supra note 13, at 370.
93. Kesan, supra note 13, at 298-99.
94. Greenberg, supra note 54, at 235.
95. Kesan, supra note 13, at 299. See generally Greenberg, supra note 54,
at 234-35; McIntosh, supra note 13, at 549-58; Schnaitman, supra note 18, at
187-91.
96. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
at 3555.




3. Congressional Recognition of the Problem
Congress, despite its lack of action, has demonstrated that it is
aware of the problems and contradictions that permeate the ECPA.
In 1991, 1992, and again in 1993, the Privacy for Consumer and
Workers Act ("PCWA") was introduced to Congress in the hopes
of addressing the issues created by electronic workplace
monitoring.9 8 The five major reforms proposed under the PCWA
were: (1) employers would be required to generally notify
prospective and current employees of how and when monitoring
may take place;99 (2) employers would be required to give specific
prior notification to an employee who would be monitored; 00 (3)
there would be a prohibition of random or periodic monitoring for
employees employed for at least five years;' 0 ' (4) there would be
additional time limits set as to the length of monitoring;' 0 2 and (5)
employers would be prohibited from taking action against an
employee based upon any personal data obtained in violation of the
PCWA. 103
Initially, this new legislation appeared to increase e-mail
privacy protections, but, again, Congress included exceptions that
bypassed such protections. If an employer had a reasonable
suspicion that an employee was engaging in conduct that was
criminal, constituted gross misconduct, was likely to cause
economic loss or injury, 04 or the employer had an "immediate
business need for specific data,"'1 5 then the employer could
monitor without regard to the prohibitions.
Although the PCWA was approved by a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Education and Labor in 1994, the bill died
there. Despite the exceptions, the PCWA was at least a step in the
right direction toward better protecting the privacy rights of the
individual. Perhaps it best serves as a signal that lawmakers are
cognizant of the problem.
98. 103 CONG. REc. S6122-23 (daily ed. May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Simon).
99. S. REs. 984, 103d Cong. § 4(a) (1993).
100. Id. at § 4(b).
101. Id. at § 5(b)(3).
102. Id. at § 5(b)(2).
103. Id. at § 8(a).
104. Id. at § 5(c).




The remaining legal remedy open to employees is either state
constitutional law or statutory law. In addition to incorporating
language that parallels the Fourth Amendment, a number of state
constitutions additionally extend to their citizens a right to
privacy. 0 6 However, those protections apply only against state
governmental entities; therefore, constitutional claims against
private employers will predominantly fail.
California under Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, °  is the only state to judicially extend its
constitutional right to privacy to the private sector. The California
Supreme Court found that the constitutional right to privacy
extended to nongovernmental entities but divided the right to
privacy into two categories: invasions "fundamental to personal
autonomy" and invasions of "less central" privacy concerns.,
0 8
Using this distinction, the court then established a balancing test of
"competing or countervailing privacy and non-privacy interests"' 0 9
that, consequently, works exactly like the expectation of privacy
requirement found in tort law. Applying the balancing test, the
court found that the National Collegiate Athletic Association did
not violate constitutional rights because the athletes' privacy
interests were reduced by their voluntary participation in NCAA
athletics.' 10 This countervailing interest analysis curtails
individual rights and diminishes the likelihood that an employee
would be able to recover under this constitutional scheme.
Additionally, this scenario will only play out in California, leaving
this type of constitutional privacy issue inapplicable in the other
forty-nine states.
Beyond constitutional protections, forty-eight states have
legislation that parallels the provisions of the federal ECPA.Il' A
106. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; RAw. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, §
6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
107. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (involving a privacy challenge against the
NCAA's drug testing program).
108. Id. at 653.
109. Id. at 655.
110. Id.at657-59.
111. The only states that do not have such statutory protections are South
Carolina and Vermont. See Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?:
Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
379, 404 (2000). In situations where a state has enacted legislation, the courts
consistently hold that the ECPA only preempts similar state laws if it is found
that the state laws are less protective of the rights of the individual. See also
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number of the states mirror the ECPA. including the consent,
business use, and provider exceptions.) 12  Twenty-two states
restrict the provider exception to common carriers of
communications and/or have no business use exception.' 13  In
thirteen states, prior consent must be obtained by all parties
connected to the communication." 4  The difficulty in
administering these conflicting jurisdictional laws is compounded
by the statutory interpretations of the state courts. For example,
Illinois courts have ruled that the all-party consent rule in reality
means the consent of at least one party." 1
5
In principal, relying on state statutes to protect employee e-
mail privacy is unwise. The protections, scope, and application
have no structure and, as one scholar noted, are "ill-suited for
regulatin, 6 a technology which erases state and national
borders." The nature of the Internet, e-mail, and the right to
privacy call for a cohesive solution best provided by federal
regulation.
United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 21 n.1 (1st Cir. 1983); Roberts v.
Americable Int'l Inc., 883 F. Supp. 499, 502-03 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
112. Adams, supra note 35, at 41.
113. Rothstein, supra note 111, at 404. Those states are Alabama, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Texas.
114. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington all
require both parties' consent to the monitoring. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§
631(a), 632(a) (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (2005); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(c)(4) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. 934.03(3)(d) (2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(a) (2003); 720 ILL. COMP. ANN. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1)
(West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (West 2002);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 99(B)(4) (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.539c (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2001); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.73.030(1)(b) (West 2003).
115. See Illinois v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957 (I11. 1994); People v.
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346 (111. 1986) See also Rothstein, supra note 111, at
405.
116. Kesan, supra note 13, at 301.
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III. E-MAIL, THE WORKPLACE, AND "OUR" PRIVACY
If you've got a boss who is monitoring e-mail to see if people
are calling him a jerk-he probably is ....
The invention of the Internet drastically changed the face of
American society. The world is literally constantly at our
fingertips, so much so that this era is often called the Information
Age. A major part of this so-called "Age" is the use of e-mail as a
means of communication. E-mail may seem complicated, but
when stripped of its technical terminology, it is actually a simple
process. Basically, the contents of the e-mail are broken down into
small packets and forwarded from one computer or network to
another until all the packets reach their destination, where they are
re-combined to form the original message."18 Amazingly, all of
this takes fractions of a second. The technology behind e-mail has
made it infinitely faster and far more efficient than postal mail;
therefore, its popularity and use have exploded.
Naturally, corporate America has been quick to take advantage
of the benefits e-mail offers its day-to-day operations--one
"benefit" being the ability to electronically monitor its employees'
use of e-mail. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that
in 1998, eighteen percent of employees were using e-mail at work,
and by 2001, that number increased to forty-two percent, 1 9 an
increase of twenty-four percentage points in just three years.
In response to increased e-mail use in the workplace,
employers have gone to great lengths to maintain a watchful eye
upon their employees. A 2005 American Management Association
survey found that seventy-six percent of employers are engaging in
some form of electronic surveillance at the workplace.' 2  Thirty-
six percent of employers track the content and keystrokes on their
employees' computers and fifty-five percent retain and review
employee e-mail messages.' 21 It was also reported that twenty-six
percent of companies had terminated someone's employment
117. See Schnaitman, supra note 18, at 178 (citing Abdon M. Pallasch,
Company Policies to Monitor E-mail Licking the Edge of the Electronic
Envelope, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 4).
118. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
119. United States General Accounting Office, Employee Privacy:
Computer-Use Monitoring Practices and Policies of Selected Companies 4,
GAO-02-717 (2002).
120. 2005 AMA Survey: 2005 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey
1, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdf.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
121. Id.
2007] 977
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
based upon e-mail use. 122 Other reports place the percentage of
employers monitoring e-mail at seventy percent and expect
electronic monitoring software sales to climb from $139 million in
2001 to $662 million in 2006.123 It appears that the situation will
worsen with time, and, if left in its current state, the law will only
become more inept.
The privacy concerns set off by employer monitoring are
intensified by statistical indications that e-mail is becoming a
dominant form of personal communication. In 2004, the U.S.
Department of Commerce reported that fifty-four percent of U.S.
households possessed Internet connections, a twelve point increase
from 2001. The report also found that one-third of the United
States has access to the Internet on a daily basis.'25 Furthermore,
the most prevalent online activity is by far personal
communications, with eighty-seven percent of Internet users
sending and receiving e-mail. 126  These numbers reflect that
American society has adopted e-mail as a means of transmitting
personal communications, many of which likely contain the very
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions ideally protected by Warren
and Brandeis's right to privacy.
The statistics demonstrate that employer monitoring has
become a part of the corporate atmosphere. Statistics also show
that e-mail is gradually developing into a mainstream medium for
personal communications. Just as it did in 1890, it seems that the
turn of this century has once again thrown "recent inventions,"
"business methods," and privacy into direct conflict.
In the workplace, this recurring conflict is framed by two
competing interests: the right of the employer to control its
business and the employee's right to privacy. 12
Employers assert that it is necessary in the furtherance of their
business that they reserve broad discretion to monitor their
employees' workplace communications. The need to protect
themselves from employee theft, security breaches, computer
viruses, and losses in productivity demand that they maintain a
watchful eye on their employees' Internet conduct.' 8 Far more
122. Id.
123. Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-mail
and Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop. Insights
from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 829 (2005).
124. United States Department of Commerce, A Nation Online: Entering the
Broadband Age 5 (2004).
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id. at 9.




terrifying to management is the possibility of incurring legal
liability for the content of e-mails sent or received by their
employees, for example, racial, obscene, or sexist material.
129
Employers embrace these concerns by asserting one general
theory: their interests should be favored because their networks,
offices, and equipment are used to facilitate the
communications.' 30
It is evident from the current state of the law that legislators
and government entities agree that the employer's interests
outweigh the employee's right to privacy. Lawmakers rationalize
this devaluation of privacy rights based on the U.S.'s concept that
the right to privacy is not an absolute right but rather an aspect of
personal property. 31 Gail Lasprogata, an assistant professor at
Seattle University, contends that the overall result of this
conceptual framework has turned "privacy [into] a commodity ...
[that] may be bargained away in exchange for employment."' 3 2
Under this scheme, the right to privacy is converted into a
contractual term or bargaining chip. Unfortunately, it is a
bargaining chip that, no matter when played, the employee loses.
If the employee wishes to maintain his right to privacy, he forfeits
employment; or, if he accepts employment, he forfeits his right to
privacy. Ordinarily, a person understands the effects of not having
a paycheck but might not comprehend the consequences of giving
up aspects of his privacy. In effect, privacy loses any real
resemblance of a "right" and becomes a perk that might
accompany employment.
Therefore, the first step in changing the law must be to change
the manner in which privacy is viewed and understood. Primarily,
the goal should be to completely erase the current property-based
concept of privacy. Warren and Brandeis initially focused upon
the individual when they defined the right to privacy as an
individual's right to control "to what extent his thoughts
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others."' 33
The origin of the "property-based" concept of privacy extends
from the influence of Prosser's classification of privacy as four
distinct torts.
129. Id.
130. Schnaitman, supra note 18, at 183.
131. See, e.g., Gail Lasprogata et al., Regulation of Electronic Employee
Monitoring: Identifying Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through
a Comparative Study of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union,
United States and Canada, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 28 (2004); Rustad &
Paulsson, supra note 123, at 833.
132. Lasprogata et al., supra note 131, at 28.
133. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.
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By converting the foundations of privacy into torts, Prosser
stripped the right of its inherently human nature. In 1964, Edward
J. Bloustein published an article criticizing Prosser's theories,
which remains pertinent in contesting the "property-based"
approach. Bloustein asserts that Prosser changed privacy from a
spiritual value to a material one,' 34 ultimately concluding that
Prosser's approach to privacy is backwards. Prosser views the
"wrong" in invading privacy as the infliction of mental distress or
infringement upon the value of one's name and reputation.135 But,
Bloustein argues that invasions of privacy are "wrong" because
they violate man's mentality, individuality, and personal dignity.1
36
Even Warren and Brandeis expressed that "it is difficult to
regard the right as one of property' ' 137 but rather a "right to one's
personality."T8 Expressions of opinions, ideas, love, anger, or
animosity between individuals are not things that should be
measured in property values. Society can measure the effects of
privacy invasions in monetary increments, but that is as far as it
should go. The right to privacy is not pecuniary but connected to
an individual's dignity, personality, and control over his own life.
Privacy rights are not bargaining chips; therefore, lawmakers need
to redefine their understanding of privacy and adjust the laws to
protect privacy, not as property, but as a right to dignity.
IV. PROPOSAL: LEGAL ADVICE FROM ACROSS THE POND, THE
DATA PROTECTION ACT IN FAVOR OF THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
It is to secure our rights that we resort to government at all.
-Thomas Jefferson139
The United States needs to reconstruct the law that currently
regulates privacy in electronic communications. This redraffing of
the law will be a difficult task and will have monumental effects
both nationally and internationally. However, the task can be
simplified if lawmakers use international bodies of law as
prototypes. While the U.S.'s attitude towards this issue has been
legally stagnant for the last twenty years, the nations of the
134. Bloustein, supra note 6, at 971.
135. Id. at 965.
136. Id. at 971,973.
137. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 200.
138. Id. at 207.
139. Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government, http://etext.virginia.edu/
jefferson/quotations/jeff0 1 50.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
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European Union 140 have confronted electronic communication
privacy and developed clear and comprehensive protections.
This comment proposes that the United States examine the
steps that the United Kingdom has taken in this area and adopt
legislation that mirrors its laws. The UK's Data Protection Act has
provisions that are best tailored to respond to corporate/privacy
conflicts-the law is modem, unambiguous, concise, and it is
grounded in the correct notions of privacy.
A. Foundations of the Data Protection Act
The European Union addressed the conflict between the
Internet and individual privacy and devised a solution that is the
polar opposite of the U.S. approach-the major difference being
that the EU's primary emphasis is upon the individual. The
Preamble of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights states that the
"Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human




This Charter of Fundamental Rights outlines the rights and
freedoms that the individual member states must respect in order to
retain their membership in the European Union.142 Each member
state controls the drafting and enforcement of its laws limited only
in that they must comply with the recognized fundamental rights.
Of the fifty-four major rights and freedoms outlined by the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, four are integral in developing the EU's
legal scheme for protecting electronic communications: (1) Article
140. "The European Union (EU) is a family of democratic European
countries that work together to promote peace and prosperity. It is not a State
intended to replace the existing European States, but is more than an
organization for international cooperation. The EU is, in fact, unique. Its
member states have established common institutions and delegate portions of
their sovereignty to those institutions so that matters of joint interest can be
resolved at a European level." Europa, Panorama of the European Union,
http://europa.eu.int/abc/panorama/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
The EU fosters cooperation among the peoples of Europe, promotes unity, and
protects shared values of democracy, freedom, and social justice. Id.
The EU was established to ensure that the killing and destruction of the
Second World War would never happen again. Id. Initially, it was made up of
only six nations focusing primarily on trade and economic interests. Id. Today,
the EU has twenty-five member states, encompasses 450 million people, and
deals with a broad spectrum of issues that are important to each member state.
Id.
141. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01,
364/8 (Dec. 18, 2000).
142. Id.
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1 firmly states that "human dignity is inviolable";' 43 (2) Article 3
grants individuals a right to their physical and mental integrity;1
44
(3) Article 7 grants individuals privacy rights in their life, home
and communications; 145 and (4) Article 8 grants individuals a right
to the protection of personal data, which must be processed fairly,
with consent of the person concerned and for some legitimate
basis.
146
Guided by the individual-based rights above, the European
Parliament 147 issued Directive 95/46/EC 148 outlining the EU's
position on the protection of the individual conceming the
processing of personal data and the movement of that data. 149 EU
directives are designed to establish specific objectives that the laws
of the member states must facilitate. Member states satisfy the
directives by designin laws that ensure the objectives are reached
within their borders.' The objective of Directive 95/46/EC is to
strengthen the protections to a person's "fundamental rights and
freedoms, notably the right to privacy," in regard to the processing
of personal data.
r Sl
B. The Data Protection Act
152
The Data Protection Act of 1998 153 gives EU Directive
95/46/EC legal effect inside the United Kingdom. Abiding by the
143. Id. at 364/9.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 364/10.
146. Id.
147. The European Parliament is elected every five years by the people of
Europe to represent their interests and is made up of 785 members from all
twenty-seven EU countries. The European Parliament's main function is to pass
European laws, a role it shares with the Council of the European Union and the
European Commission. Parliament also shares joint responsibility for approving
the EU's annual budget. The Parliament elects the European Ombudsman, who
investigates citizens' complaints regarding maladministration by the EU
institutions. See Europa, Panorama of the European Union, http://europa.eu.int/
abc/panorama/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007) for more information on
the organization and institutions of the European Union, including the European
Parliament.
148. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EU).
149. Directive 95/46/EC can be found at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/
eudirective/EU Directive .html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
150. See Directive 65/46/EC of the European Parliament,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EuropeanUnion-directive (last visited Feb. 15,
2007) for additional information on EU directives.
151. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) Recital 2 (EU).




Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU Directive, the UK law
focuses upon the rights of the individual rather than the interests of
another party. The DPA accomplishes this by way of eight Data
Protection Principles. 154 These eight principles work as guidelines
that regulate the type, extent, and form of data processing, as well
as the uses of the processed data. They are as follows:
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully
and, in particular, shall not be processed unless-
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the
conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more
specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further
processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or
those purposes.
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which
they are processed.
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary,
kept up to date.
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes
shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that
purpose or those purposes.
6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the
rights of data subjects under this Act.
7. Appropriate technical and organizational measures shall
be taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of
personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of,
or damage to, personal data.
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or
territory outside the European Economic Area unless that
country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection
for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to
the processing of personal data.
55
The DPA refers to those whose data is being processed or
monitored as "data subjects" and labels those controlling the data
processing as "data controllers."' 56 For the purposes of the DPA,
the term "data" is applicable to a broad range of situations. In its
broadest sense, it means information processed by automatic
154. Id. at Schedule 1.
155. Id. at Schedule 1, Part I.
156. Id.atPartl.1.
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equipment or recorded as part of a relevant filing system.' 57 The
relevant filing system refers to a set of information that specifically
relates to an individual or his criteria.158 A more specific form of
"data" under the DPA is personal data. Personal data is data
relating to an individual who can be identified from that data.' 59
The definition of the term also includes any expression of opinion
about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data
controller.' A more specific and the most protected form of data
under the DPA is sensitive personal data.' 61 This form of data is
defined as data that pertains to racial origins, political opinions,
religious beliefs, membership in a trade union, sexual life, physical
or mental health, and allegation or commission of a crime. 1
In order to comply with the DPA, a data controller must take
the necessary steps to ensure that processing does not violate any
one of the eight Data Protection Principles. Each individual
principle builds upon the protections afforded under its
predecessors, resulting in an inter-reliant protective framework.
The first principle regulates exactly when electronic processing
can take place. This principle on the whole requires that "data
shall be processed fairly and lawfully."' 63  Additional DPA
provisions clarify that "fairly" means that the data subject is
supplied with the identity of the data controller, the purpose for the
processing, and any other information that is relevant to the
specific circumstances of the processing.' 64 The DPA also requires
that, in determining fairness, the method of processing must also
be considered. 1
65
In addition to the obligatory degree of fairness, the first
principle provides two sets of "conditions" that must be present in
order for processing to take place. The first set of "conditions"
permits processing when any one of the following is present: (1)
the data subject consents; (2) processing is necessary in
performance of a contract; (3) processing is necessary to comply
with a legal obligation; or (4) processing is necessary to protect the
vital interests of the data subject.166 The second set of "conditions"







163. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1. 1.
164. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 11.2(3).
165. Id. at Schedule 1, Part II.1(1).
166. Id. at Schedule 2.1-5.
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"sensitive personal data."' 67 When processing sensitive personal
data, the first principle requires that a condition from part (a) be
accompanied by the data subject's explicit consent and that the
processing be necessary for the protection of the data subject or
others. 
68
The DPA also permits processing when a government entity or
an employer obtains a judicial order compelling processing.
Processing is also allowed if the data controller can demonstrate
that there is an urgent legitimate issue.' 69 While this appears to
operate in the same way as the ECPA's legitimate business
purpose exception, it is not the same. Application of this condition
is preempted if any unwarranted prejudice to the data subject's
rights or freedoms occurs.'
70
The second principle limits the range and scope of processing
by allowing processing only for specified purposes that are
communicated to the data subject. 171 This works to prevent data
controllers from engaging in continuous or random monitoring.
Principles three through five regulate the quality, duration, and
security of the data legally obtained by the data controller,
primarily ensuring that the data remains accurate and relevant.
1 72
The sixth principle, illustrating the DPA's emphasis on the
individual, demands that processing be in accordance with the
"rights of the data subject."' 73  DPA protections grant the
individual a broad range of rights, most importantly, entitlement to
notification from the data controller when data processing is going
to take place and for what purposes.' 74 The data subject also has
the right to demand that the data controller prevent or stop
processing that is likely to cause substantial damage or distress to
the data subject or another.175 A data subject may also prevent a
data controller from making a decision based solely upon the
processed data if that decision significantly affects the data
subject. 176  However, this right to contest a data controller's
167. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1.1. See source cited supra note 152 for a
description of sensitive personal data.
168. Id. at Schedule 3.1-10.
169. Id. at Schedule 2.6.
170. Id.
171. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1.2 and Schedule 1, Part 11.5.
172. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1.3-5.
173. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1.6.
174. Id. at Part I.7.
175. Id. at Part lI.10.
176. Id. at Part lI.12(1).
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decision might be exempted if the decision is related to a
contractual obligation.' 7
7
The seventh principle requires precautionary measures that will
prevent unauthorized processing and damage to the personal data
of any individual. 78 The final principle prevents transmission of
data into countries whose laws afford fewer protections than those
required by the EU Directive. 79 In its current state, the U.S. law is
classified as a country with fewer protections, meaning that
personal data within the United Kingdom should be prohibited
from being transmitted to the United States.8 0
C. The Battle of the Acronyms: The DPA v. the ECPA
Juxtaposed against the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, the Data Protection Act proves to be a better body of law in
every aspect. The terminology, framework, and provisions are
easily applicable to any setting where data processing creates
conflicts between the rights of the individual and a larger entity-
whether that be the government, a third party, or an employer. In a
workplace context, the DPA is better suited to protecting the
privacy interests of the employee while ensuring that the employer
is not stripped of the ability to protect his interests.
The principal difference in the two bodies of law results from
divergent foundational origins. The ECPA is grounded in the
U.S.'s property-based outlook on privacy while the DPA
approaches privacy as a component of human dignity. These
contrasting tenets create legal schemes that protect completely
different entities: the employer under the ECPA and the individual
under the DPA. As aforementioned,' 8' the U.S.'s property-based
approach needs to be replaced by a concept centered upon the
individual. What better way to accomplish this than to enact law
that is rooted in "plac[ing] the individual at the heart of its
activities' 8 2 and grants the individual legal rights that can be
asserted to protect his privacy? 18 3
177. Id. at Part 11.12(6), (7).
178. Id. at Schedule 1, Part 1.7.
179. Id. at Schedule 1, PartI.8.
180. See EU and U.S. "Safe Harbor" Plan, http://www.export.gov/
safeharbor/.html, for more information on the prohibition of data transfers from
the European Union to the United States. This subject is complicated and its
scope extends beyond the focus of this comment.
181. See infra Part II.B for discussion of notions and concepts of privacy.
182. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01,
364/8 (Dec. 18, 2000).
183. See generally Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, Part II, §§ 7-15 (Eng.).
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The principal flaw of the ECPA is a dual construction that
provides, at best, piecemeal protection and is largely known by
courts as complex and convoluted. 84 Alternatively, the DPA is
comprehensive, clear, and easily applied to the circumstances it
was designed to regulate. Under the ECPA, a party has to worry
about what is or is not an electronic communication, whether it is
being transmitted or stored, and then determine if any of the
exceptions apply to the situation. Under the DPA, parties only
have to determine if "data" is being processed and then apply that
processing to the structure of the eight Data Protection Principles.
Additionally, the DPA's "data subject" and "data controller" are
more efficient and clear characterizations of the possible parties
involved.
In regard to protecting the individual, there is almost no
comparison. At the most basic level, the ECPA fails to refer to
privacy or the rights of the individual, while the DPA constantly
mentions and focuses on privacy throughout the body of law. The
DPA also requires compliance with eight principles that are
collectively geared to protecting the rights and freedoms of the
data subject. Given the restrictive effect of the statutory
exceptions, the ECPA's protections rarely extend to the individual.
In the workplace, the exceptions cause the ECPA to be ineffective
in protecting the employee, while the DPA grants rights to the data
subject that can be used to combat invasive employer
monitoring-the most progressive right being the ability to
challenge a data controller's decision made pursuant to the
processing. The provision even refers to a data subject's
"performance at work" as one of the challengeable "decisions.' ' 185
The two main benefits under the DPA that are non-existent
under the ECPA are: (1) the notice requirement; and (2) increased
protections for "sensitive personal data."' 86 Expecting notice prior
to processing is a small investment that provides a huge return in
employee privacy. Notification also fairly balances and represents
the interests of employer and employee alike. Notifying the
employee removes a substantial portion of the invasive nature of
secretive monitoring, which generates the most privacy concerns.
Furthermore, notification does not impose a substantial burden on
184. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
185. Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, Part 11.12(1) (Eng.).
186. Id. at Part .1.
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employers nor does it diminish their ability to protect themselves,
their business, and their facilities.
Heightened requisite protections for sensitive personal data are
ideal for protecting the privacy of the individual-primarily
because this type of information will most likely be the "thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions" that Warren and Brandeis endeavored to
protect. 18 7  Additionally, this distinction between types of data
further reconciles the privacy interests of the employee with the
interests of the employer. Increasing protections for data likely to
involve personal privacy concerns of the employee does not rob
employers of their ability to protect interests of a more direct
business nature.
Another benefit of adopting similar DPA legislation is that the
United States will no longer be concerned with the European
Union ban on transmitting data into countries whose protection
schemes are found to be inadequate.188 Lagging behind the
European Union in this domain erects needless obstacles that
interfere with international commerce and relationships.
Additionally, it is irresponsible for the United States to continue to
allow laws enacted in 1986 to regulate 2007 technology. A body
of law drafted only nine years ago is able to respond and adapt to
changes in modem technology in ways that a twenty-year-old law
could never envision.
The DPA is founded upon the correct notions of privacy and
the provisions have a superior structure, are unambiguous, and
more conducive to the protection of the rights of the individual.
Thomas Jefferson believed that the people revert to government in
order to secure their rights,189 thus, the United States needs to
adopt a body of law that adequately protects its citizens' rights.
The United States needs to look no further than the European
Union and the United Kingdom for a model of what steps to take.
187. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195.
188. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) Ch. 4, art. 25, Principles 1-6
(EU). Article 25(1) states that "Member States shall provide that the transfer to
a third country of personal data ... may take place only if. .. the third country
in question ensures an adequate level of protection." Id. Under the Data
Protection Act, this portion of the EU Directive is complied with through the
eighth Data Protection Principle: "Personal data shall not be transferred to a
country or territory outside the European Economic Area unless that country or
territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of
data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data." Data Protection Act
1998, c. 29, Schedule 1, Part I (Eng.). See also EU and U.S. "Safe Harbor"
Plan, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/html, for an informal explanation of the
ban and its effects upon the United States, including certain steps taken to create
methods for data exchange between the European Union and the United States
189. See source cited supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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The Data Protection Act protects the rights and freedoms of the
individual, and the United States should enact legislation which
emulates that specific body of law.
V. CONCLUSION
The technology of the Internet and e-mail has drastically
reshaped the concept of privacy that began over a century ago.
Allegedly, the right to privacy was recognized to better protect the
rights of the individual in light of social and economic demands.
1 90
Regrettably, legislators seem to have forgotten this fact when
regulating the employee/employer relationship as it relates to e-mail.
Workplace privacy, under existing legal privacy protections, is a
quintessential misnomer. From tort law to federal law to state law,
an employer is permitted to indiscriminately monitor employee e-
mail use without regard to employee privacy.
Warren and Brandeis singled out "recent inventions and
business methods" as threats to individual autonomy that warranted
a specific recognition of the right to privacy.19' Today, e-mail and
workplace monitoring have developed into urgent individual privacy
threats, but, to date, have been largely ignored. The law in effect
distinctly favors the employer while ignoring the employee's right
to privacy; therefore, steps need to be taken in order to keep an
individual's right to privacy intact. The best venue for protecting
privacy in the electronic workplace is through federal legislation. At
present, the twenty-year-old federal legislation is antiquated, inept,
and confusing; thus, an ideal setting for development exists.
The "next step"'92 in protecting the rights of the individual is for
the United States to abandon the federal Electronic Communications
Privacy Act and enact legislation modeled after the UK's Data
Protection Act. For the past twenty years, privacy protections
within the United States have remained stationary while the
European Union and the United Kingdom have transformed and
modernized their approaches. Congress must take action; protecting
the rights of individuals is a progressive endeavor that must keep
pace with the times.
Ray Lewis*
190. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193.
191. Id. at 195.
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